INTRODUCTION
Are corporations committed to compliance with law?
The Principles of Corporate Governance 2 demand a corporate commitment
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Section 2.01 does not adopt this position. With few exceptions, dollar liability is not a "price" that can properly be paid for the privilege of engaging in legally wrongful conduct. Cost-benefit analysis may have a place in the state's determination whether a given type of conduct should be deemed legally wrongful. Once that determination has been made, however, the resulting legal rule normally represents a community decision that the conduct is wrongful as such, so that cost-benefit analysis whether to obey the rule is out of place.... Section 2.01(b)(l) is based on the moral norm of obedience to law. 10 This is an ethical viewpoint that rejects very narrow interpretations of legal requirements and, therefore, rejects attempts to evade legal requirements. In cases of uncertainty, conduct consistent with the law's purpose is the proper standard against which to judge ethical conduct.
B. Organizational Theory: Complexity and Corporate Decisions
Complexity theory, sometimes referred to as chaos theory, presents a different view of the determinants of human behavior, including corporate conduct. It is not a normative viewpoint but one that examines actual conduct in the market. The starting point in complexity theory as applied to human behavior is that actions are influenced by many factors. Complexity recognizes that an effect is often not the product of one constant cause. Rather, it results from the interaction of many forces. 1 In corporate decision making, this includes cost projections, risk projections, legal mandates, industry norms, societal norms, as well as other influences (e.g., the personality and viewpoint of the CEO). The strength of the influence of each factor (e.g., risk projections) varies over time and within different factual contexts. The outcome (decision) is a result of the interaction of all of the relevant influences and the synergy produced from such interaction. In other words, there is not a linear relationship between a particular influence and resultant outcomes.12 10. Id. comment g. 11.
NICOLIS & PRIGOGINE, supra note 3, at 6. 12 . In linear systems, there is a proportionate relationship between cause and effect, and the mathematical relationship between variables is stable. In nonlinear systems, the cause-effect relationship is not proportionate and relationships between 770
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Organizational theorists have embraced complexity theory and applied it to decision making in business organizations. 13 Thus, the theory has been applied to analyze how information is processed in organizations. 14 It has also been applied to characterize successful organizations as organizations that embrace and respond to principles recognized in complexity theory, such as nonlinear feedback and chaotic equilibrium. 5 Organizational behavior as seen through the lens of complexity theory is summarized in the following study's findings regarding corporate environmental performance:
Corporate environmental behavior and motivation are extremely complex. They involve the interaction of numerous variables, difficult to measure. It is harder still to assign an appropriate weight to each variable, or to perform a reliable quantitative multivariate regression analysis.... Nevertheless,.. . [b]oth our quantitative and qualitative analysis leave us convinced that theories of corporate environmental behavior that focus on a single variable -whether legal, economic, or attitudinal -are almost always doomed to be incomplete and inadequate. 16 Given the complexity that characterizes corporate decision making, the best evidence of the influence of various factors on corporate decisions is to study outcomes under varying legal regimes. Actual market conduct reflects the interaction of various variables, including law.
Earlier studies have found that various influences play a role in corporate decisions regarding corporate compliance with lawinfluences in addition to the legal mandate or the sanction imposed for variables are dynamic, rather than stable. JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 23-25 (1987 chs. 3, 4 (1992) . The concept of equilibrium points within an outer boundary set by a strange attractor is discussed infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
16. Kagan, Gunningham & Thornton, supra note 13, at 76.
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violation. 17 The studies have called into question the influence of the severity of sanctions on legal compliance,' 8 and whether the perceived obligation to comply with a legal mandate is the most important factor determining corporate conduct. 19 Recognition that non-legal factors play an important role in influencing corporate decisions, combined with complexity theory's concept of nonlinear relationship between various influences and a particular outcome, has led some commentators to conclude that law is unnecessary to induce ethical business conduct. 2° However, the 17. Peter J. May, Compliance Motivations: Affirmative and Negative Bases, 38 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 41 (2004) (summarizing prior studies regarding the influence of various factors such as inspection frequency and consistency, perceived legitimacy of regulations, reputation, and ability to comply, including costs and competitive effects); Kagan, Gunningham & Thornton, supra note 13, at 67-69 (finding firm-level economic differences and community pressures as having significant effects on companies' environmental performance); BRENT 227, 233, 243 (1983) ( showing studies of adverse publicity and corporate reaction to it, finding many of the companies studied introduced substantial reforms in the wake of their adverse publicity crisis which, although perhaps in only a small way, would reduce the probability of recurrence of the offense or wrongdoing. In many cases thorough ongoing reform was forsaken for piecemeal changes).
18. May, supra note 17, at 55-56 (showing that studies are mixed with respect to findings concerning the effect of the level of sanctions for compelling compliance, and this study finds that fear of sanctions and fear of legal liability has little effect); John This article focuses on misleading reports issued by securities analysts. It presents a case study of industry costbenefit evaluations that lead the corporate actor to evade or, at times, ignore the law.
A. The Challenge
Securities analysts evaluate securities and estimate their value as investments for potential investors. They collect and review information about the corporations that they are evaluating, including information found in company documents filed with the SEC, materials sent to shareholders, trade publications, and information obtained in interviews with company officers and employees and visits to company sites. 26 So called "sell-side analysts" are generally employed by brokerage firms and produce reports and buy-sell recommendations for the firm's The investors that might rely on the reports and recommendations are not typically sophisticated investment entities that regularly trade in securities, such as mutual funds, hedge funds, insurance companies or retirement funds. Rather, such entities employ their own, so-called "buy-side analysts" who generate reports solely for their employers and not for the general public. 28 In recent decades more and more individuals have embraced the securities market as a vehicle for channeling their savings and other financial assets.
2 9 Thus, individual investors and, in many cases, unsophisticated individual investors are increasingly the recipients of analysts' reports and recommendations.
Analysts face conflicts of interest on several fronts. First, they are employed by securities firms, and analysts' recommendations generate brokerage commission revenues for their employers. 3 In a related vein, the securities firms typically engage in the investment banking business as well. Securities analysts help to develop and maintain relationships with investment banking clients of the firm, and, therefore, generate investment banking fees for their employers. 3 Similarly, at Morgan Stanley, research analysts were compensated, in part, based on the degree to which they helped generate investment banking business for the firm. In their annual performance evaluation, analysts were asked to submit self-evaluations that often included their involvement in investment banking, including a description of specific transactions and the fees generated. 3 36 Third, analysts, their employers, and other employees of the firm commonly had ownership interests in the companies that the analysts were covering. 37 Thus, given these conflicts of interest, the challenge is to issue fair, accurate research reports and recommendations. From the standpoint of assessing ethical behavior, in some cases inaccurate reports and recommendations can violate legal prohibitions aimed at protecting investors against fraudulent practices.
B. The Legzal Environment
As described below, members of the securities industry have settled charges of violations of state antifraud statutes, rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and National Association of Securities Dealers , available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ testimony/073101ortslu.htm. The SEC's on-site examinations of nine full service brokerage firms discovered that, in seven of the nine firms inspected, investment banking had input into analysts' bonuses and the analyst hiring process. Id. The staff inspections also reported, "[i]nterviews with former analysts revealed that it was well understood by all of these analysts that they were not permitted to issue negative opinions about investment banking clients." Id.
36. Orcutt, supra note 26, at 22. 37. Id. at 22-25; Fisch & Sale, supra note 26, at 1043-44. The SEC's on-site inspections of nine full service brokerage firms found that about one quarter of the analysts inspected own securities in the companies they cover. Testimony of Laura S. Unger, supra note 35.
38. New York's Martin Act prohibits any "fraud, deception, concealment," any "promise or representation.., which is beyond reasonable expectation or unwarranted 
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and NYSE 3 9 that are alleged to be violated and that are also vague legal standards.
The governing statutory standard is found in the antifraud provisions of the federal securities law. The settlements reached were based on section 15(c) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 because the particular securities in question were traded over-thecounter. 40 However, section 10(b) of the Act could have been invoked for securities other than those traded over-the-counter. 41 These statutes prohibit "any manipulative, deceptive or other fraudulent device or contrivance" to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of any 42 security.
The purpose behind these antifraud provisions is to protect the average investor against overreaching. As one leading commentator has explained: 
778
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The antifraud provisions are part of a statutory scheme that resulted from a finding that securities are "intricate merchandise" and a congressional determination that the public interest demanded legislation that would recognize the gross inequality of bargaining power between the professional securities firm and the average investor. "The essential objective of securities legislation is to protect those who do not know market conditions from the overreachings of those who do." 43 In a similar vein, the courts have explained that "[a] fundamental purpose, common to these [federal securities] statutes, was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry."4 Thus, the ethical obligation to act in accordance with the purpose behind the governing law would require a commitment on the part of securities firms to insure fair, accurate reports and recommendations on the part of securities analysts. Did the securities industry's actions reflect commitment to compliance with the law, including its underlying purpose?
C. The Industry Response
Through the late 1990s and thereafter, the industry's response was to ignore the proscription against deceptive statements and practices and, instead, boost investment banking and brokerage earnings by overstating predictions of corporate earnings, 45 and maintaining strong "buy" recommendations 46 for stocks despite analysts' privately held views that the recommendations were not justified. Also, the response was 45. Orcutt, supra note 26, at 50 (noting that while academic studies have confirmed that analysts consistently overestimated earnings forecasts, these studies did not isolate the cause of the overestimates).
46. Id. at 11-13 (finding that studies have confirmed over-optimism in buy recommendations). See also Fisch & Sale, supra note 26, at 1045-46 (concluding that analysts' recommendations are consistent with their employer's incentives but not those of the investing public). Also, independent analysts' behavior differs substantially from that of analysts employed by securities firms. Id. at 1051. These studies do not document the cause of the over-optimism.
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frequently to boost personal fortunes by issuing rosy forecasts for stocks in which the analyst, the analyst's employer, or other employees had an equity stake that they could sell after a lock-up period. 47 Charges alleging such activities have been brought and have been settled against twelve securities firms. 4 8 The practices uncovered have been characterized as widespread and continuing for many years as an industry practice.
4 9 Some examples illustrate the industry viewpoint that increased profits was more important than a commitment to fair and accurate reports and recommendations by analysts.
At Merrill Lynch, analysts provided Infospace, Inc. with the firm's highest rating, but privately the analysts labeled Infospace "a powder keg" and a "piece of junk." 50 
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analyst issued a "market perform" rating on Eprise Corporation while privately referring to the company as "permanent toast., 60 The persistence of an industry-wide culture of ignoring the federal antifraud law's underlying purpose is witnessed in reactions and responses to the global settlement reached with the SEC. Statements made soon after the settlement were to the effect that the securities firms had done nothing that should be of concern to their clients. 61 This reaction received a rebuke from the SEC.
Similarly, actions taken soon after the settlement also evidence a culture of ignoring the law's purposes and perhaps its literal requirements. The settlement prohibited analysts from engaging in marketing or selling efforts to investors with respect to investment banking transactions. Yet Bear Stearns distributed to clients an intemet "roadshow" broadcast in which one of its senior analysts glowingly touted iPayment Inc., a company Bear Stearns was taking public. 62 In addition, Bear Stearns, Citigroup and other investment banks distributed analysts' revenue and earnings estimates for companies whose initial public offerings they were underwriting. 6 3 In the latter case, the firms claimed analysts could, under the settlement, prepare internal use memoranda and participate in efforts to educate the sales force. Yet, the reports were being distributed to investors, and the settlement also stated that firms could not do indirectly what they are barred from doing directly. 64 
D. Conclusion
A vague statutory standard was not determinative of analyst conduct in the securities industry. The purpose behind the legal standard was ignored and, at times, the legal standard itself was violated by many members of the industry.
These findings contradict the assumption in the PART THREE -RECOGNIZING AND EMBRACING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS Law commonly takes the form of a vague standard, whether a common law standard or a statutory standard. Law also frequently employs a disclosure standard. However, it is not the legal mandate itself but the interaction of many influences that is determining corporate conduct.
These various influences can be described as costs of compliance/noncompliance, benefits of compliance/noncompliance, or the means to evaluate whether the costs exceed the benefits.
Thus, cost-benefit evaluations are not to be ignored, as demanded by the Principles of Corporate Governance, but need to be studied in order to make law a more effective influence on corporate behavior. Part Three of this article explores this issue by examining the role of cost-benefit evaluations in the law and in corporate decision making.
A. Cost-Benefit Evaluations in Corporate Decisions on Legal Compliance
The law and economics literature has, at times, suggested that costbenefit analysis is relevant in determining whether corporate actors acted reasonably in discharging their legal obligations, with legal sanctions treated as prices for noncompliance. 6 5 This approach has been criticized, largely on normative grounds. 66 The Principles of Corporate Governance accepts the latter position as a normative principle and as a mandatory principle of conduct. It takes the position that the law does Many legal regimes are characterized by vague legal standards. When this is the case, the corporation must assess whether its actions are in violation of a governing legal standard, and, if so, what response is required. Both assessments are being made in an environment of uncertainty regarding the legal mandate. Added to this uncertainty, at times, is additional uncertainty regarding the likelihood and type of sanction if the corporation is deemed to be in noncompliance. In choosing to define the legal mandate broadly, which would best serve the law's purpose, or narrowly, which would avoid changing current corporate practices that are profitable, cost-benefit analysis inevitably influences the corporation's assessment.
B. Evasion of Law As A Reasonable Decision
Decision Making in a Cost-Benefit Context
Existing studies of organizational behavior have found that both legal and non-legal factors influence corporate decisions. Factors exerting an influence, 68 although not necessarily a determinative influence, include concern over community reputation, community pressure and publicity. These are influences based, in part, on social norms. Other factors exerting an influence are competitive pressures and reputation among peers. These are influences based, in part, on industry norms. Other influences on corporate behavior are assessments of costs of compliance and financial capabilities. Finally, the factors exerting an influence on corporate decisions include legal regimes. This encompasses not only the law's mandate, which was examined in Part Two of this article, but also enforcement measures, such as inspection 67. ALI, supra note 10. 68. Supra notes 20-21.
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All of these influences, including the type of legal mandate imposed, can be best understood as interacting in the context of a costbenefit evaluation. Some influences are costs or benefits of compliance. These include direct costs of compliance, competitive pressures, severity of legal sanctions and publicity (either favorable or unfavorable). Other influences are upon internal evaluation of costs and benefits. This includes the type of legal mandate. For example, a vague legal mandate permits reasonable denial of noncompliance and influences the assessment of likelihood of sanctions. Factors influencing corporate evaluations also include factors affecting evaluations of risk, such as inspection frequency and likelihood of imposition of sanctions based on past practices. Finally, they include factors that help the corporate actor weigh costs versus benefits and arrive at a decision regarding corporate behavior. These include industry norms and community pressures. Thus, all influences uncovered in past studies and in the case studies in this article are best understood when they are viewed in the context of the overall approach taken by corporate actors to decision making. Namely, they are best understood not when studied individually but when studied as components of an interacting group of influences all of which play a role in corporate cost-benefit evaluations.
How does complexity, namely the synergistic interaction of distinct influences, affect this viewpoint? Existing studies have largely taken a reductionist view of individual influences. They have sought the one or several influences that alone or in conjunction determine corporate conduct. However, complexity theory forces us to recognize that human behavior results from the interaction of many influences, with the role played by individual influences varying in differing contexts and the synergy produced by the interaction of influences leading to unpredictable outcomes. 69 This is not to say, however, that we cannot draw conclusions regarding frequently recurring outcomes to test general propositions. Examination of market outcomes allows us to see results produced after the interaction of a variety of influences. Such market outcomes were examined in the case studies in Part Two. What recurring conclusions were witnessed? First, the law's mandate was not determinative of corporate behavior. This reflects the weak influence of social norms, 
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not only the general norm of compliance with law, but also specific social norms reflected in the specific purposes behind the mandates studied in Part Two.
"
Second, a variety of other influences that individually or in conjunction might lead to legal compliance, such as reputational concerns, publicity, and community pressure, in fact did not typically engender legal compliance. All of these influences, or fears of them, existed in the case study in this article, yet none led to commitment to legal compliance. This has implications for free market proponents. 7 Non-legal influences, such as reputational concerns or competitive pressures, did not lead to a strong commitment to the law's mandate or its underlying purpose even when such purpose reflects accepted social norms. Thus, the free market viewpoint that inspection and enforcement measures are unnecessary, or that a legal signal (a legal regime) is itself unnecessary, is discredited in the case studies in Part Two.
How then can organizational behavior be changed so as to embrace a greater commitment to legal compliance? The position in this article is that recognizing corporate cost-benefit evaluations and incorporating such evaluations into legal regimes would achieve this result. The means to accomplish this result while embracing complexity theory and evidence of complexity in organizational behavior is discussed section C, below.
However, this article first examines the role played by psychological influences on organizational behavior, their effects on evaluations of risks and benefits, and the reason such influences lead to lack of commitment to legal compliance in many legal regimes that have been utilized. It then explores an alternative legal regime that exerts greater influence on corporate behavior. 70 . The legal mandate discussed in this article reflects social norms that direct members of our society to avoid taking financial advantages of others who may not be able to protect themselves (e.g., the securities industry case study).
71. See discussion, supra note 20.
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Denial As A Behavioral Tendency
Two types of behavioral tendencies lead corporate actors to choose to evade legal mandates and purposes when commitment to compliance undermines maximization of profits. 72 The first behavioral tendency is denial. This includes denial of responsibility or fault, which undermines the potential influence of the social norm of conformity with law. For the individual, corporate structures allow individuals to deny personal moral responsibility for corporate actions by claiming they are merely agents rather than decision makers. 73 Given the large number of individuals involved in corporate decisions, as well as the inherent nature of the corporate structure in which all directors and senior officers are merely agents for shareholders, corporate structures permit denial of responsibility even among senior level executives and corporate directors.
For the corporation as an entity, the denial of responsibility or fault takes various forms. First, there is a denial of legal noncompliance. Given the vague nature of most legal mandates, such denial is almost always an option. Neither the legal mandate nor the required course of action is clear, and, therefore, denial of noncompliance becomes a prevailing practice. 7 4 In the securities industry, members strongly denied any wrongdoing when charges were brought by regulators based on securities analysts' conduct. Merrill Lynch, for example, stated it always had procedures in place to protect the independence of research analysts and claimed that evidence uncovered by the New York State Attorney General merely "may have appeared" inconsistent with Merrill Lynch's published recommendation. 7 " Morgan Stanley's CEO stated, "I don't see anything 
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in the settlement that will concern the retail investor about Morgan Stanley., 76 He received a strong rebuke from SEC Chairman Donaldson and then apologized for the remark. 7 7 Similarly, Citigroup claimed that changes it had agreed to in its settlement were merely aimed to ensure that the firm "adhere to the new standards that are emerging. 78 In other words, past actions fully complied with standards traditionally imposed but were criticized only due to the emergence of new standards. Merrill Lynch's CEO wrote an editorial in the Wall Street Journal in which he stated:
Risk-taking is essential to capitalism. Without it, the system can't function .... Of course, in any system predicated on risk-taking, there are failures, sometimes spectacular failures. But for every failure to be viewed as fraudulent or even criminal bodes ill for our economic system. The message to CEOs, to entrepreneurs and to venture capitalists right now is that you cannot afford to be wrong.79
In other words, there was no wrongdoing -only losses resulting from normal investment risks. Both responses evidence denial of noncompliance as one level of corporate response.
A second form of denial is denial of responsibility for outcomes. At times, this takes the form of shifting blame to external forces such as market conditions. The securities industry case study provides such an example, with investors' losses blamed on the decline in the value of telecommunications stocks and not on the misleading analyst recommendations. 8 
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Decision Making Heuristics
The second type of behavioral tendency that leads corporate actors to evade legal mandates and purposes is resorting to decision making heuristics that exaggerate benefits and minimize risks of noncompliance. For the purposes of this article, the most relevant heuristic devices witnessed that minimize risks of noncompliance are skewed risk perception, simplified decision making strategy and omission bias. The most relevant heuristic devices witnessed that exaggerate benefits of noncompliance are the endowment effect and combined loss aversion/risk aversion.
Skewed risk perception is the inverse relationship found in individuals' perceptions of risks versus benefits. When a high benefit is perceived (e.g., high profits produced by a course of action), then any risk posed by the activity is viewed as a low risk, whereas when a low benefit is perceived, then any risk posed by the activity is viewed as a high risk. This is regardless of the actual objective level of risk that a disinterested third party would perceive. 8 1
Simplified decision making strategy is a response to complexity when individuals are faced with a number of interacting variables and uncertainty in expected future outcomes.
Such complexity (e.g., determining the adverse profit consequences of a change in product design, or the probability of exposure to legal liability when liability is based on numerous, vague prerequisites to recovery) is beyond human cognitive ability to process.
As a result, individuals resort to a simplified decision making strategy. They typically give the highest value to the choice that is most important to the decision maker, 83 (e.g., preserving high profits). In addition, they typically ignore risks that are viewed as low probability risks 84 (e.g., successful private lawsuits where a cause of action is difficult to prove). 
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Omission bias, sometimes referred to as regret theory, refers to the finding that individuals regret adverse consequences stemming from their actions more than adverse consequences stemming from inaction. 85 Thus, risks from maintaining the status quo (e.g., risk of exposure to liability) are minimized while risks of changing the status quo (e.g., loss of profits) are exaggerated.
Turning to the perception of benefits of noncompliance, the endowment effect is a finding that individuals place greater value on what they already own than on what benefit they might receive from a future change in conduct. 86 This is related to risk aversion. Risk aversion is a finding that individuals are averse to expected gains from a change in a course of action. They prefer greater certainty when the benefit is a proposed future gain as opposed to the predicted gain from maintaining the status quo. 87 Loss aversion is a finding that individuals fear losses, indeed they fear losses roughly twice as much as they enjoy gains.8
The result of these three heuristics is that benefits of maintaining the status quo, which evidences a low commitment to legal compliance, are exaggerated. The obvious benefit sought to be preserved is high profits from the current corporate course of conduct. At the same time, a change in course of conduct is resisted in part because gains are uncertain.
Many of the psychological studies exploring human decision making have been conducted on individuals, responding as individuals. 89 However, further studies have found no differences in uses of decision making heuristics in group decision making, such as may exist in an organizational setting. 90 These decision making heuristics are evidenced in the conduct of corporate actors. This evidence is explored below. Citigroup's cost associated with a strong commitment to compliance with federal securities regulations governing analysts' conduct would be the loss of investment banking fees and brokerage commissions produced by trading in recommended shares. Court documents reveal the investment banking fees earned by Salomon Smith Barney due to specific technology stocks for which its top telecommunications analyst, Jack Grubman, provided misleading buy recommendations. These commissions exceeded $1 billion in the years 1998 through 2001.91 This was the revenue produced by wrongdoing on the part of only one analyst. Moreover, it does not include brokerage commissions earned due to trading in the stocks in question. Thus, the overall benefit of noncompliance to Citigroup was significantly more than $1 billion. Indeed, Citigroup's head of equity research saw a threat to $16 billion in fees. What were the risks of noncompliance?
The perceived legal risks were the imposition of sanctions by the SEC and, possibly, awards of damages in lawsuits brought by investors. At the time of the wrongdoing both risks were low probability risks.
Conflicts of interest faced by securities analysts had existed industry wide for many years and had not been challenged by regulators. 92 If actions had been taken, the cost was predicted to be small. Prior to the SEC's fine levied against the bankrupt WorldCom 
2006]
DOES THE LA W ENCOURAGE UNETHICAL 791 CONDUCT IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY?
Inc., the SEC's biggest fine against an operating company had been just $10 million. 93 Private lawsuits alleging securities law violations against analysts were viewed as difficult to prove and, therefore, unlikely to be successful. 94 The difficulty lies in proving all of the elements for recovery, including scienter and causation. 95 Each of these elements may be justified in isolation, 9 6 but they lead to the conclusion that risk of liability is a low probability risk and, therefore, can be ignored or assumed when the firm is faced with large profits from a particular course of conduct. Indeed, the experience of plaintiffs' attorneys in lawsuits later filed based on misleading securities analysts reports have confirmed the assessment that few can be successful. 
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In 2003, Citigroup settled with the SEC and state securities regulators by agreeing to pay $400 million in monetary sanctions, which included $150 million as a penalty. 98 This sanction was unexpected. 99 Some lawsuits brought by investors have yielded large recoveries. For example, a settlement of a class action lawsuit by investors in WorldCom, Inc., which focused in part on misleading ratings by telecommunications analyst Jack Grubman, was for the sum of $2.65 billion,' 00 or $1.64 billion after tax.' 0 ' However, this was an unusually large settlement. Previous large settlements in securities class action cases have been in the hundreds of millions of dollars. 
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WorldCom settlement and Citigroup's possible exposure to liability was unexpected before the fact.
In hindsight, Citigroup's decision not to strongly commit to legal compliance could be viewed as an unreasonable decision. Losses from noncompliance have been substantial. However, this is an assessment made in hindsight. At the time the decisions were made, they could be viewed as reasonable decisions made in light of cost-benefit evaluations. At the time, risks of noncompliance were low probability risks. Moreover, when the WorldCom settlement is viewed as an atypically large settlement, Citigroup's decision may not even be clearly unreasonable. Apart from the WorldCom settlement, when all lawsuits involving misleading analyst statements are settled, revenue benefits of noncompliance may still exceed costs of noncompliance.
Finally, it is not even clear that the large fine and settlement due to analyst activities would itself alter industry conduct in future activities. There have been one-time, large settlements in the past, 1°4 yet they did not alter industry commitment to legal mandates and their purposes, as evidenced by conduct in recent years. Perhaps each large settlement is viewed as a unique occurrence, and each factual setting in which fraud is alleged is viewed as a unique factual context.
As discussed above in the Citigroup example, at the time corporate decisions were made the actual risks of noncompliance could be viewed as low probability using an objective measure of risk. Moreover, when skewed risk perception is introduced as a decision making heuristic, the assessment of probability drops even further. This is because the high benefit produced, in the form of billions of dollars in revenues, further diminishes the assessed probability of risk. Simplified decision making 
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strategy confirmed this conclusion with regard to investor lawsuits. Such suits required proof of numerous legal prerequisites for recovery, including intent, reliance, and causation.' 15 As a result, processing probable outcomes was beyond human cognitive ability. Using simplified decision making strategy, the highest value is given to the outcome that is most important to the decision maker -e.g., preserving existing high revenues -while low probability risks are ignored.' 0 6 This approach, combined with omission bias, also skews decisions in favor of maintaining the status quo rather than actively committing the firm to greater commitment to legal compliance. The actual adverse impact on revenues of modifying analysts' research reports and recommendations is unknown and unknowable.
However, risk of changing the status quo (e.g., loss of revenues) is exaggerated in the mind of the decision maker. The endowment effect and loss aversion serves to confirm the conclusion that noncompliance is a wise course of action in the mind of the corporate decision maker, because existing, high profits from current conduct (the status quo) are most important to that decision maker.
Overall, the law's vague mandate to the securities industry -to avoid fraudulent conduct -generates denial rather than compliance. In addition, cost-benefit evaluations made in light of behavioral heuristics lead to the conclusion that evasion, rather than commitment to the law and its purposes, is the reasonable course of conduct.
C. An Alternative Regime: Market-Based Sanctions as a Strange Attractor
The evidence presented in this article leads to the conclusion that the law must overcome three substantial barriers regarding legal compliance. First, industry norms must be overcome. Part Two of this article documented prevailing industry practices -practices seeking to avoid or evade compliance with law when it will adversely affect corporate profits. In the securities industry case study, regulators eventually took action to stop misleading statements due to analyst conflicts of interest that were no secret in the securities industry and had 105 Second, the behavioral tendency to deny responsibility and fault must be overcome. One conclusion that can be drawn from the case studies is that greater certainty in the law is one approach to overcoming denial of responsibility. Yet there are significant limitations to relying solely on this approach. First, it addresses only one form of denialdenial of noncompliance. It does not address the other denial strategies -e.g., denial of responsibility. 10 8 Second, in many situations certainty in the legal mandate -i.e., certainty in the required course of conduct for corporate actors -is a difficult or infeasible option. For example, what precise disclosures of risks or likelihood of benefits would be imposed on all securities analysts in all future research reports? Certainty in proscribed courses of conduct is often not a practical, and at times not even a possible, alternative. In addition, at times certainty in proscribed conduct is counterproductive, in that corporations, faced with continuing pressure to maximize profits, search for and exploit loopholes in the proscribed standard.' 0 9 Thus, more is needed. What is needed is a legal regime that motivates corporate actors to commit to legal compliance rather than to seek ways to avoid or evade the law.
This requires overcoming industry norms, behavioral tendencies of denial, and decision making heuristics that currently favor maintaining strategies that evade the law even in the face of potential or actual sanctions.
The alternative proposed is one that uses industry norms and decision making heuristics in a manner that compels greater commitment to legal compliance. The proposal is one that embraces the corporate strategy of employing cost-benefit evaluations in making decisions on legal compliance but skews evaluations in such a manner that benefits of compliance outweigh costs of noncompliance more often than under current legal regimes.
The proposal relies on market-based sanctions, as opposed to the sanctions of injunctive relief, fines or recovery of damages that are typically relied upon currently. The proposal is best understood by first examining complexity theory's concept of strange attractors.
Complexity theory recognizes that human behavior results from the interaction of many factors and, therefore, precise outcomes are unpredictable. However, such outcomes are not chaotic. Rather, there is an outer boundary that constrains outcomes. Precise outcomes can fall anywhere within the outer boundary. Such boundary, or strange attractor, can be the result of self-organization," 0 or it can be externally imposed.
1"
The Principles of Corporate Governance assume that the law acts as the outer boundary for corporate ethical behavior. " 2 Thus, actual conduct will vary from firm to firm but conduct will always fall within the outer boundary which is the legal mandate applicable to a particular situation. Schematically, this can be represented as follows: 
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See generally
Outcomes
The challenge is to draw the actual strange attractor (outer boundary) to corporate behavior, as evidenced by actual outcomes in the market, closer to the legal mandate. The alternative legal regime I
propose is a greater use of market-based sanctions.
Experience in the banking industry with the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) provides support for this alternative. The proposal is to rely on loss of market share as a sanction for noncompliance with law. This sanction can be combined with a clear legal mandate, or it can be combined with a vague legal mandate, as it has been in the CRA experience. Thus, continued use of vague legal standards becomes a possibility without sacrificing corporate commitment to compliance.
Citigroup's response to a variety of charges of violations of law also illustrates the effectiveness of market-based sanctions. In recent years, Citigroup faced a number of scandals involving violations of law, including misleading reports issued by securities analysts, mutual fund abuses, and aiding fraud committed by clients such as Enron. 113 Yet a strong commitment to legal compliance emerged only after Japanese authorities shut down its private bank operations and banned Citigroup from participating in its government bond auctions.
14 After these actions on the part of Japanese authorities, as well as the possibility that European government officials would forgo choosing Citigroup to underwrite international bond offerings because of ethical lapses in Europe, the cost-benefit evaluation changed dramatically for Citigroup. 1 15 Lost business and market share was no longer a cost of compliance but instead a cost of noncompliance.
Once again, 
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noncompliance was no longer a reasonable corporate decision.
Self-regulatory agencies and the SEC are exploring greater use of a form of market-based sanction, by imposing business line suspensions, such as five-day suspensions for registrations of brokers, on securities firms charged with regulatory wrongdoing." 6 This article urges greater use of market-based sanctions.
The Community Reinvestment Act' 17 offers a model of a legislative scheme that completely alters corporate cost-benefit evaluations and leads to heightened commitment to compliance with law. The statutory mandate is a vague one -namely, a financial institution must meet "the credit needs of its entire community, including low-and moderateincome neighborhoods, consistent with the safe and sound operation of such institution ...
The regulations implementing the Act did little to clarify the financial institution's obligation. There was no required level of commitment and no stipulated activities or course of conduct.' 19 The corporation itself was asked to determine what specific action and what level of commitment would meet the statutory mandate. Indeed, the corporation itself was asked to define the assessment area in which the sufficiency of its activity would be judged. 20 On its face, this vague legal regime should encourage cost-benefit evaluations. Indeed, the statute itself spoke of the balancing of safety and soundness considerations against the duty to serve a community's credit needs. As a result, denial of noncompliance, a narrow reading of statutory obligations, and lack of commitment to the law's purpose should have
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survey by the New York Banking Department similarly found a substantial change in bank lending practices over the 1991 to 1993 period. 40 The CBA survey was limited to retail banking institutions who were members of the CBA. Such institutions focus on home equity lending. 141 A later survey of the largest retail banking institutions, including both commercial banks and savings associations, conducted by the Federal Reserve Board in 2000, found 73 percent of respondents offered at least one CRA special lending program.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Law is not necessarily determinative of corporate conduct. In an industry subject to a vague legal standard, the influence of law on corporate conduct is weakest. This article examined the conduct of securities analysts in response to the vague legal mandate provided in the federal securities law. Yet the legal regime faced by securities analysts is a regime that is common in United States law. It is a regime based on (a) a vague legal mandate, that leads to ease of denial of respondents in 1993, up from 88.6% in 1992.
More flexible debt-to-income requirements were reported by 83.5% of respondents, compared to 82.1% a year earlier.
Relaxed loan-to-value ratios were reported by 80.1% of respondents, up from 71.5% a year earlier. (2000) . The most frequently mentioned special lending programs offered were more flexible underwriting criteria, a second review of loan applicants to determine qualifications, special outreach and marketing activities, waived or reduced fees, pre-loan education or counseling to applicants, and reduced interest rates.
